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feature
PATENTS

Negative innovation: when patents are bad
for patients
Incentives in patent law have driven innovation into spaces that are affirmatively harmful to patients, and patentees
are discouraged from taking steps to improve the product so as to prevent adverse health outcomes.

P

atent law in the United States is
historically premised on advancing
the interests of society. From the store
of productive activity available to all, the
government restricts some activities for
a limited time in hopes this will redound
to the benefit of all by incentivizing
innovation1. The law thereby restricts
competition, forgoing the concomitant
advantages of the free market, but only
during the patent period. After that time,
the law expects that competition will enter,
driving down prices and spurring new
innovation. From this perspective, US patent
law centers on the benefit to the public, with
the inventor’s reward providing the vehicle
for accomplishing this jurisprudential goal.
In the health care space, these
incentives have resulted in extraordinary
success stories, but the same incentives
can also result in a range of undesirable
consequences, including excessive
development of similar (but not better)
products (‘me-too drugs’), the focus on
drugs for diseases that affect wealthy people
and wealthy countries rather than diseases
that disproportionately affect the poor and
developing nations, and a lack of innovation
for types of medicines that may return fewer
profits, such as antibiotics2–4. Similarly, drug
companies will not research the utility of a
known (and hence unpatentable) chemical,
since the ability to obtain patent protection
is central to their business model5.
Past literature has highlighted these
problems but has largely overlooked the
problem of ‘negative innovation’, in which
patent law drives innovation into spaces that
are affirmatively harmful to patients. By this,
we mean scenarios whereby patents create
incentives to bring a product to market in a
way that is relatively harmful to consumers,
and the existence of a patent (and the
associated rents) discourages the patentee
from taking steps to improve the product so
as to prevent the adverse health outcomes.
Of course, there are other patent-driven
situations of problematic utility, including
scenarios that result in purely financial
harms, such as drugs that are no better than
existing options but are more expensive;
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scenarios where a small, heightened risk of
direct physical harm is offset by lower prices
for the drug in question6; and scenarios
where there is no existing product on
the market and inadequate incentives to
develop such a product, so any physical
harm is the result of the underlying disease
or illness7. Finally, there is a general concern
that inadequate new information about
existing products is generated in the current
system8. All of these scenarios are different
in kind from negative innovation, which
results in a harmful (but profitable) product.
We focus on this dangerous but overlooked
space of the patent landscape, wherein
patents themselves lead fairly directly to
patient harm.
What does negative innovation look
like? We highlight a particularly pernicious
example, the case of Imbruvica (ibrutinib);
suggest the likelihood of broader problems;
and outline various strategies for preventing
such outcomes going forward.

The case of ibrutinib

Ibrutinib, a small molecule drug discovered
by Pharmacyclics (now a subsidiary of
AbbVie), is an irreversible inhibitor of
Bruton’s tyrosine kinase (BTK), a key
regulator of B cell signaling and growth.
It is approved by the US Food and Drug
Administration for multiple indications
and is most commonly used to treat B
cell cancers, such as chronic lymphocytic
leukemia. While ibrutinib is effective, it,
like all anticancer agents, is toxic. It is all
the more puzzling, then, that ibrutinib’s
recommended dosage appears to be
substantially higher than necessary to
achieve the necessary therapeutic effect—or
at least, what evidence is available points
to that conclusion9. Problematic incentives
created by the patent system make this result
unfortunately unsurprising.
The basic story is disheartening
but simple. Early studies published by
Pharmacyclics showed efficacy at low doses
(partial response at 1.25 milligrams per
kilogram body weight, approximately
40% response at 2.5 mg kg–1, and no
relationship of response to dose between

2.5 and 12.5 mg kg–1)10. These reports were
shared by Pharmacyclics in a conference
abstract in 200911,12 and a press release
in 201013. An early patent application by
Pharmacyclics (US 2012/0087915 A1)
accordingly claimed a full range of doses.
Trials to support approval by the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
continued. In July 2013, ibrutinib received
accelerated approval for mantle cell
lymphoma based on a 66% response rate in
111 patients treated at 560 mg daily. Notably,
the 2013 FDA review included an analysis of
the relationship of ibrutinib dose and trough
plasma concentration to both response and
toxicity. This analysis demonstrated no
relationship with response: “Dose-response
relationship for BTK occupancy and clinical
response in the phase 1 dose escalation trial
showed that maximum BTK occupancy
and maximum response were achieved at
doses of ≥ 2.5 mg/kg (≥ 175 mg for average
weight of 70 kg)”14—far below the approved
dosage of 560 mg.
Meanwhile, the FDA also granted
accelerated approval for previously
treated chronic lymphocytic leukemia on
12 February 2014 on the basis of a 58%
response rate in 48 patients treated at a
dose of 420 mg daily. Thus, there were now
two different doses approved for ibrutinib,
with the labeled dose based solely on the
dose that was used in the single-arm studies
supporting the accelerated approvals.
Furthermore, in the context of that approval,
the FDA reiterated its assessment that the
labeled dose was higher than necessary and
included the explicit suggestion to study
lower doses: “However, the proposed dose
is 2.4-fold higher than the lowest dose that
resulted in maximum BTK occupancy and
maximum clinical response. Dose-response
relationship for ORR and BTK occupancy
from phase 1 study suggested that
maximum ORR and maximum occupancy
was achieved at doses of ≥ 2.5 mg/kg
(≥ 175 mg for average weight of 70 kg)
[see Pharmacometrics review in DARRTS
dated 11/01/2013]. The sponsor should thus
consider exploring lower doses in future
development programs.”15

Nature Biotechnology | VOL 39 | August 2021 | 914–917 | www.nature.com/naturebiotechnology

feature
Those lower doses have not, to our
knowledge, been rigorously explored in
clinical trials—an unfortunate outcome
for patients, since if a lower dose is just as
effective with lower side effects, treatment
would be safer and better. However, if the
lower dose were found to provide better
patient outcomes and resulted in a change
in the labeled dose, it is likely that the
labeled dose would not be covered by the
patent. Thus, generic competitors might be
able to enter the market sooner, once the
primary compound patent lost exclusivity.
In fact, the process at the US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and the limits
of the granted patents encourage the
patent holder to avoid such information
entirely. The patent examiner evaluating
Pharmacyclics’ method of treatment patents
found lower doses obvious on the basis of
the 2009 and 2010 conference and press
release disclosures, which occurred more
than a year before the relevant patent was
filed. Only the highest doses—420 mg
and higher—were granted in the issued
method of treatment patent16. Patent law
thus created incentives to pursue a higher,
more toxic dose rather than the lower
doses the FDA suggested be explored. And,
adding insult to injury, once the patent was
issued with narrower claims covering the
high doses only, the drug sponsor not only
lacked incentives to explore the possibility
of lower doses, it had an active incentive
not to explore those doses because evidence
that lower doses were safe and effective
would sharply reduce the economic
significance of the method of treatment
patent it had narrowly managed to obtain.
The patent holder already knew it could not
get protection on a lower dose––the USPTO
had rejected lower doses as obvious––
so any evidence of the importance of
lower doses would have undermined the
value of the company’s patent-protected,
higher-dose product.

Broader possibilities

Although ibrutinib is only one example, we
are concerned that it may be an indicator
of a broader problem, one that either
lies ahead or is already lurking. More
generally, consider combination products
with two drugs at fixed dosages. Many
treatment method patents exist in which
an independent claim specifies a dose,
nominally designed to increase patient
adherence but often at a much higher
cost17,18. The result is that a prescriber
cannot adjust the dosage for only one of
the two drugs or discontinue only one
component. It is possible, perhaps likely,
that some of these combination regimens
mirror the dosage issue with ibrutinib, in

which the incentives of the patent system
have encouraged the development of
a drug in a form that is suboptimal for
patient health in certain circumstances.
This would not be the first time in history
that combination medications have
proven problematic. More than 50 years
ago, a US Senate investigation found that
certain combination antibiotics products—
developed in an effort to bring something
‘new’ to the market—were useless or
dangerous19. Nor is ibrutinib the only time
in history that medications have been sold
at higher dosages than appropriate for safety
and efficacy. Millions of women received
the birth control pill Enovid (mestranol/
noretynodrel), containing ten times the
necessary dose, before studies pointed to a
concerning risk of blood clots19. In another
sign of negative innovation, Gilead Sciences
is alleged to have intentionally delayed a
less-toxic version of its HIV medicine until
just a few years before the original version’s
patent expiration20.
Unfortunately, the pernicious impact of
patent incentives described above means
that not only are these situations possible,
but it is hard to know how frequent or how
serious these situations are. Pharmacyclics
did not follow the recommendation from
the FDA and others to study lower doses.
Because its method of treatment patents
were tied to the higher dose, they had no
economic incentive to do such research—
any information on safer dosing outside the
scope of the issued claims would undermine
the value of their existing patent, and they
would be unable to get a new patent for the
safer dose on grounds of obviousness. The
safety data are starting to emerge anyway,
albeit from sources other than the company9.

Solutions

Designing the right solution to the problem
of negative innovation is tricky. Patents
that drive negative innovation look much
like patents that drive positive innovation.
However, we see three possibilities for
potential action.
The first approach lies within existing
patent law. Patent law includes a requirement
that inventions must be “useful.” For well
over a century, this requirement has been
largely moribund; rather than evaluating
whether inventions improve social welfare,
courts and the USPTO have largely been
content to ask whether an invention does
something—anything, really—and then
to let the market sort out the bad from the
good. This approach works well for most
consumer goods, but poorly for medical
products: the market is deeply fragmented,
regulations limit consumer decisions and
product substitution, and the ‘consumer’ is a
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confused mélange of physician, patient and
insurer21. One avenue for reform might be to
enforce a more rigorous utility requirement
for pharmaceutical patents, demanding
that they actually improve social welfare
relative to the prior art3,22. This would not
be trivial—among other things, patents are
often filed early, while the jury is still out
on the magnitude of any benefits, and that
magnitude is often hard to measure—but
one could imagine a regime that requires
certification of likely improvement, followed
by a demonstration that the improvement
had materialized, on pain of losing the
patent21. This approach could be combined
with a strengthening of postmarketing
surveillance (including a default preference
for routine phase 4 trials) to evaluate
real-world efficacy and cost-effectiveness.
Second, greater coordination between
agencies would reduce the problem of
negative innovation23. Under the current
system, innovators can say one thing to one
agency and something different to another.
More generally, agencies do not know what
other agencies are doing: the USPTO is
unlikely to know that the FDA has found an
approach predictable (or unpredictable) or
a method dangerous, or even that clinical
trials are under way or a drug has been
approved. The FDA, conversely, may not
know whether a patent is truly relevant
and should be listed as covering a drug or
not. Similarly, on a political-economy level,
patent applicants can wear down a patent
examiner through repeated filings in a way
that they simply cannot wear down the
FDA24. Greater communication among the
agencies (and their parent departments)
would help resolve these problems and
support socially valuable innovations.
Third, the different forms of exclusivity
for pharmaceutical products could be
linked—and capped. The current jumbled
system of compound patents, method of
treatment patents, formulation patents,
new chemical entity exclusivity, pediatric
exclusivity, orphan drug exclusivity and other
incentives creates limitless opportunities for
gaming the system. Coordinating incentives
and limiting the overall exclusivity associated
with any one base product could help limit
such gaming, though of course this is easier
said than done.

Conclusions

Negative innovation causes real
harms. Ibrutinib is a case study of the
risks that resulted from the ability of
Pharmacyclics to game the patenting and
drug approval processes. The costs and
health consequences are borne by payers
(including large self-insured corporations)
and cancer patients, who are subjected to
915
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a patent-protected dosing method far in
excess of what is required to obtain the
desired therapeutic effects—a point that
the FDA noted in its initial 2013 review—
which may also result in unnecessary
cardiovascular toxicities9. If we want to
prevent repetition, we need to mandate
greater coordination between the FDA and
USPTO, create robust incentives (including
severe penalties) discouraging drug
companies from engaging in such conduct,
and fix the regulations that allowed and
potentially encouraged this outcome.
Of course, all of our proposals involve
difficult and complicated issues of
implementation. However, if we want to
prevent future negative innovation and
the associated harms to patients, we need
to make some changes. Promoting the
progress of Science and useful Arts—the
Constitutional purpose of the patent
system—demands nothing less.
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